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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

HEALTHCARE’S HIDDEN CIVIL RIGHTS LEGACY

DAVID BARTON SMITH, PH.D.*

I. SUMMARY
Much of the health care civil rights story in the United States remains
hidden. It is unfamiliar even to many who currently struggle to end racial
disparities in health care. This Article describes the events between 1948 and
1968 that eliminated legally sanctioned segregation and narrowed the gaps in
gross racial disparities in access to care. Yet these events also altered the
organization of care in ways that have contributed to the persistence of
disparities in access and outcomes. A sequence of events during this time
ultimately led to a federal court ruling that the provisions in the 1946 Hill–
Burton legislation permitting the use of federal matching funds for the
construction of racially separate hospitals were unconstitutional.1 This
decision played a key role in the construction of Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (Civil Rights Act) and in the reasoning behind it, as well as in the
implementation of Medicare in 1966 to enforce compliance with the Act upon
hospitals.
These noble efforts, however, left unaddressed the racial disparities in the
practice patterns of physicians and contributed to profound shifts in the
organization of care, producing an expansion of private accommodations, a
reduced length of stay in hospitals, a greater reliance on ambulatory care, and a
rapidly expanding separate nursing home sector. As a result, many disparities
in specialized and diagnostic services persist, contributing to disparities in
health outcomes. The basic legacy of the health care civil rights movement is

* Professor in the Department of Risk, Insurance and Healthcare Management in the Fox School
of Business and Management at Temple University. The author presented this Keynote Address
at the 15th Annual Health Law Symposium hosted by the Saint Louis University School of Law
in April 2003. He received a 1995 Robert Wood Johnson Health Policy Research Investigator
Award for research on the history and legacy of racial segregation in health care. He has
authored or co-authored more than thirty health service research related articles and five books,
including Health Care Divided: Race and Healing a Nation (The University of Michigan Press
1999) and his most recent work Reinventing Care: Assisted Living in New York City (Vanderbilt
University Press 2003).
1. Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 938 (1964).
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the lesson that grassroots social movements and real accountability in the use
of public funds can make a difference. In fact, in the absence of both,
disparities will persist.
II. INTRODUCTION
Senator Trent Lott (R–Miss.), at the 100th birthday party for retiring
Senator Strom Thurmond (R–S.C.) on December 5, 2002, said that he still
wished Thurmond had won the presidential race in 1948. He declared: “When
Strom ran for president, my state voted for him . . . [a]nd if the rest of the
country had followed Mississippi’s example, we wouldn’t have faced many of
the problems we have since.”2 Thurmond, as everyone was reminded by the
brief public outrage that followed those comments, had bolted with the
“Dixiecrats” from the Democratic Party because of its strong civil rights
platform, and said that, “all the laws of Washington and all the bayonets of the
army cannot force the Negro into our homes, our schools, our churches, and
our places of recreation.”3 Senator Lott’s slip in an unguarded moment broke
through the façade of a carefully sanitized, reconstructed past for the person
who was to assume the position of Senate Majority Leader and thus become a
spokesman for his party and the nation as a whole.
Buried far deeper below the surface of the nation’s collective
consciousness about the racial divides of that past and not even mentioned by
Thurmond in his 1948 segregationist battle cry, were the hospitals and the
structure of the health care system of the United States. The subsequent battle
regarding their integration proceeded quietly behind the scenes, rarely sparking
headlines, public protests, or formal legal proceedings. Yet the scars of those
battles now litter the health care landscape of this country. They add to the
cost of health care, contribute to racial disparities in treatment, block
meaningful health care reform, and generate a level of distrust that feeds a
growing medical malpractice crisis and slows medical research and
development. The story is a complex one, and parts of it have been
extensively documented elsewhere.4 This article tries, though it is often

2. See, e.g., P. Mitchell Prothero, Sen. Thurmond Celebrates 100 Years, UPI, Dec. 5, 2002,
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
3. JOHN EGERTON, SPEAK NOW AGAINST THE DAY: THE GENERATION BEFORE THE CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE SOUTH 477 (1994).
4. See generally COMMITTEE ON UNDERSTANDING AND ELIMINATING RACIAL AND
ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, UNEQUAL TREATMENT:
CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE (Brian D. Smedley et al. eds.,
2003) [hereinafter UNEQUAL TREATMENT]; DAVID BARTON SMITH, HEALTH CARE DIVIDED:
RACE AND HEALING A NATION (1999) [hereinafter HEALTH CARE DIVIDED]. See also KEITH
WAILOO, DRAWING BLOOD: TECHNOLOGY AND DISEASE IDENTITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY
AMERICA (1997); VANESSA NORTHINGTON GAMBLE, MAKING A PLACE FOR OURSELVES: THE
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difficult, to “connect the dots.” It summarizes a hidden part of the civil rights
story and how that struggle between 1948 and 1968 reshaped the organization
of health care in the United States. “The past,” as William Faulkner reminds
us and as this account demonstrates, “is never dead. It’s not even past.”5
III. HEALTH CARE CIRCA 1948
Health care in the United States in 1948 was sharply divided along racial
lines. In the South, Jim Crow laws imposed separate accommodations. In
communities not large or affluent enough to afford separate, full-service
hospitals, Blacks were sometimes cared for in basement wards and separate
wings. In Wilmington, North Carolina, for example, the James Walker
Memorial Hospital and Community Hospital provided a colored ward with
about twenty-five beds and two toilets.6 The ward was in a building separated
from the main hospital, so patients requiring surgery had to be wheeled across
an open yard to the hospital’s operating rooms.7 In many areas, blacks were
excluded from the community’s hospitals altogether. For example, in the
1940s, Broward County Florida had two hospitals—one municipal and one
private—and both excluded the county’s more than 30,000 black residents
from any care.8 Blacks were also excluded from white areas of the county by
vagrancy laws that permitted local police to arrest them and put them on work
gangs to harvest crops if they could not pay the heavy fines for violating such
laws.9 In 1940, a gang of white youth bent on more aggressively policing the
streets shot a young black man in the abdomen. He died without access to
hospital care, and an outraged black community pulled together to create
Provident Hospital, a modest thirty-five-bed cottage hospital for blacks.10
In many larger southern communities, racially separate hospitals were
clustered near each other to accommodate white physicians with racially mixed
practices. In Mobile, Alabama, for example, four hospitals were clustered
within several blocks of each other.11 The 540-bed Mobile Infirmary Medical
Center, the well-endowed, dominant institution in the region’s medical and
social hierarchy, served only whites.12 Mobile General Hospital, the city’s
247-bed public hospital, served the indigent in racially segregated units.13 The
BLACK HOSPITAL MOVEMENT 1920–1945 (1995); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON,
AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993).
5. WILLIAM FAULKNER, REQUIEM FOR A NUN 92 (1951).
6. HEALTH CARE DIVIDED, supra note 4, at 75-76.
7. Id.; see also HUBERT A. EATON, EVERY MAN SHOULD TRY 53 (1984).
8. HEALTH CARE DIVIDED, supra note 4, at 19.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 155.
12. Id.
13. HEALTH CARE DIVIDED, supra note 4, at 155.
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city’s 262-bed Catholic facility, Providence Hospital, also provided
accommodations to blacks in small and often overcrowded wards.14 The only
hospital in which black physicians could obtain admission privileges was a
recently constructed thirty-five-bed facility, Saint Martin de Porres Hospital,
which provided private care to paying blacks.15 The area served by these
hospitals was about one-third black,16 so that while one could describe the care
as separate, it could hardly be characterized as equal. Many of the black
hospitals were castoff facilities vacated by white-only institutions after the
construction of new accommodations. Indeed, with rare exceptions such as the
twin towers of Atlanta, Georgia’s public hospital, Grady Memorial, hospital
care for blacks and whites in the United States was far from equal. Grady’s
twin towers, still a part of Atlanta’s skyline, had been planned as an airtight
defense of the separate but equal doctrine. Interestingly, its construction begun
in 1954, the same year as the Brown v. Board of Education decision.17
Private-practice care for blacks in the South was limited. Most white
physicians who provided care for black patients either arranged to see them
after normal office hours or provided separate accommodations. Recalling her
childhood in the 1950s in Greenville, South Carolina, for example, one person
said:
When I was growing up, Dr. Bailey on Main Street in Greenville was the
family physician. There was a separate waiting room for blacks, and you had
to wait till all the white patients had been seen before he’d see the blacks. As
long as white patients kept coming in, you kept being pushed further and
further back.18

In the North, at least in urban areas with a large concentration of blacks,
the degree of racial segregation in the health care system was almost as
complete as in the South. While care could be just as separate and unequal as
in the South, the way this was achieved in the North was more subtle. In
Chicago, Illinois, for example, almost all black hospitalizations took place
either at Cook County Hospital (Cook County) or the historically black,
Provident Hospital, bypassing many voluntary hospitals that were closer in
proximity to most black neighborhoods. Seventy-one percent of all black
deaths and fifty-four percent of all black births took place at Cook County

14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 50. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kan., 347 U.S. 483
(1954) (overturning the “separate but equal” doctrine set forth in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537 (1896)).
18. HEALTH CARE DIVIDED, supra note 4, at 10.
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Hospital while only two percent of white births took place at Cook County.19
These differences could not be explained by differences in health insurance
coverage. Members of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters and some of
the local members of the meat packing union had better coverage than most
whites with employer-based coverage, but they were still routinely sent to
Cook County for hospital care.20 The segregation resulted from the exclusion
of black physicians from the privileges of admitting patients to these hospitals
and the informal understanding of white physicians, who did have such
privileges, about where it was acceptable to admit their black patients.21 In
1951, a black patient with a skull fracture was turned away from Woodlawn
Hospital in a racially mixed neighborhood, only to die several hours later. This
incident sparked the creation of the Committee to End Discrimination and a
ten-year battle to open staff privileges at the voluntary hospitals to black
doctors.22
Blocked in both the South and the North from white hospitals in the first
half of the Twentieth Century, black physicians adapted by developing a
separate system. More than 200 historically black hospitals served black
communities at some time during the first half of the century, many providing
nurse training programs and several dozen providing residency training
programs for medical graduates.23 Excluded from white professional societies,
they had developed their own local professional societies that made up the
National Medical Association and the National Association of Colored
Graduate Nurses.24 They formed their own hospital association and hospital
standardization initiative through the National Hospital Association.25 The
vast majority of black physicians received their education at Meharry Medical
College and Howard University College of Medicine, the nation’s two

19. Discrimination in Hospitals: Extension of Remarks of Hon. Barratt O’Hara of Illinois in
the House, 84th Cong. (1955) (not in permanent edition of the Congressional Record) (on file
with author).
20. See id. A union study in 1954 revealed that almost twenty-three percent of insurance
claims for minority members of the meatpacking industry, who were the “beneficiaries of the
most liberal type of health insurance plan,” were made at Cook County Hospital. Id.
21. Audio tape: Interview with Quentin D. Young, M.D., former Chairman of the Medical
Committee for Human Rights and member of the Committee to End Discrimination in Chicago
Medical Institutions, in Chicago, Ill. (June 14, 1997) (on file with author).
22. Id. See also COMMITTEE TO END DISCRIMINATION AT WOODLAWN HOSPITAL, FACTFINDING REPORT (1953) (on file with author).
23. See, e.g., NATHAN WESLEY, JR., A REPORT ON BLACK HOSPITALS: 1998 UPDATE AND
SELECTED COMMENTARY, A COMPREHENSIVE REPORT ON THE STATUS OF BLACK HOSPITALS
(1998).
24. See David B. Smith, The Racial Integration of Medical and Nursing Associations in the
United States, 37 HOSP. & HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN. 387-401 (1992).
25. GAMBLE, supra note 4, at 35-69.
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surviving historically black medical schools from the pre-Civil Rights era.26
However, some northern medical schools, such as the University of Michigan
and Ohio State University, had begun admitting two blacks to each of their
classes during the 1940s. The assumption was that the black students would
serve as lab partners and would be placed in residency programs at black
hospitals, but they would not be considered for residencies at the school’s own
hospitals.27
The paradox about this separation was that it was a double-edged sword. It
marginalized black physicians and dentists and limited their opportunities; yet,
particularly in the South, it also insulated them from white control, and that
insulation gave them the freedom to act as advocates for their patients and the
communities that they served. They did not need to worry about losing
hospital privileges that they did not have or about gaining membership in
professional societies that they were not permitted to join. They also did not
need to worry about being excluded from health insurance plans that neither
they, nor their patients, participated in. What these black physicians and
dentists did have was a loyal following of patients who trusted them, looked to
them for broader community leadership, and assured them, at least in the urban
areas of the South with a growing black middle class, a secure fee for service
and thus a livelihood. The white establishment could not threaten that
livelihood as it could threaten local businessmen whose loans and contracts
could be terminated or teachers who could be fired if they pressed too hard for
social change. If one looks at the NAACP archives of correspondence with
local chapters during the 1940s and 1950s, the letterhead of those local
chapters reflects that the majority of its officers were doctors and dentists. In
fact, dentists were particularly prominent. Their practices were more selfcontained. Unlike physicians, they were less likely to need the assistance of
white specialists to care for their patients in hospitals. In many of the lawsuits
that were brought to integrate schools and hospitals, dentists figured
prominently as plaintiffs. From the 1930s through the 1960s, they were the
backbone of civil rights efforts in the South. Without them, there may never
have been a Civil Rights Movement.
While one had to assume that racial disparities in access to care were large,
no one really knew because no one had tried to measure them. Society does
not measure what it does not want to know and does not want to do anything
about. The debate regarding national health insurance and President Harry
26. Paul B. Cornely, Negro Students in Medical Schools in the U.S., 1955–56, 48 J. NAT’L
MED. ASS’N 264 (1956). In June 1955, there were a total of 173 black medical school students
graduating in the United States. Of these students, 132 of these were graduates of either Meharry
or Howard. Id.
27. Audio tape: Interview with Paul B. Cornely, Professor Emeritus, Department of
Preventive Medicine and Public Health, Howard University College of Medicine, in Washington,
D.C. (August 7, 1990) (on file with author).
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Truman’s subsequent effort to produce effective legislation was hindered by
this indifference. While racial health disparities were well documented,
documentation of access disparities—the “smoking gun” that could assign
some of the responsibility to the way health care was organized and financed—
were lacking. Opponents of national health insurance insisted that no drastic
measures were required and that anyone who really needed medical care
received it. Indeed, despite the stark racial separation documented in this
Article, no spokesperson for any group in the United States, regardless of any
political ideology or racial attitudes, has ever advocated that essential care
should be denied to those who cannot afford to pay for it, nor has anyone ever
acknowledged that he or she has discriminated on the basis of race in the
provision of care. National estimates of the use of health care by blacks did
not begin to be collected until the introduction of the National Health Interview
Survey in 1958.28 This information about income and racial disparities in
access to care played an important role in increasing the pressure for the
passage of the Medicare and Medicaid legislation in 1965.29
IV. CUTTING THE GORDIAN KNOT
What was most troubling in 1948 was not that these conditions existed, but
rather how impossible it seemed that there would ever be any significant
change. In most communities, the racial integration in hospitals and health
care was off the radar screen, and integration efforts focused on schools and
public accommodations, which seemed easier to achieve. There had only been
a few modest successes in health care by 1948. Black physicians had gained

28. See Nat’l Center for Health Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Nat’l
Health Interview Survey, at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/about/major/nhis/hisdesc.htm (last modified
March 21, 2003) [hereinafter NHIS]. The NHIS is the principal source of information on the
health of the civilian non-institutionalized population of the United States and is one of the major
data collection programs of the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). Id. The National
Health Survey Act of 1956 provided for a continuing survey and special studies to secure accurate
and current statistical information on the amount, distribution, and effects of illness and disability
in the United States and the services rendered for or because of such conditions. Id. No
nationally representative surveys on access to health care services that included comparisons by
race and income had been completed before this survey. See RONALD ANDERSEN & ODIN W.
ANDERSON, A DECADE OF HEALTH SERVICES: SOCIAL SURVEY TRENDS IN USE AND
EXPENDITURE 6-8 (1967). The survey referred to in the Act is now called the NHIS, and it was
initiated in July 1957. See NHIS, supra. While these national surveys were complemented by a
series of surveys beginning in 1953 and conducted by the Health Information Foundation and
National Opinion Research Center (HIF/NORC), which focused on health insurance issues, racial
disparities in access to care were not reported before the HIF/NORC survey conducted in 1964.
See ANDERSEN & ANDERSON, supra, at 5-6.
29. The statistics collected by the National Health Survey that showed a direct relationship
between use of services and income and an inverse relationship between medical need and
income provided the context in which the Medicare and Medicaid legislation was debated.
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hospital privileges at public hospitals in some urban areas, where black votes
increasingly mattered to elected officials.30 In addition, growing nursing
workforce shortages in the 1940s had forced some white hospitals to begin
hiring black nurses.31 However, voluntary hospitals and local medical
societies were insulated, self-perpetuating private governments that answered
to no one, and the public political process seemed equally impermeable and
was thus ineffective in forcing change upon these institutions. At a national
legislative level, the seniority system allowed southern senators and
congressmen to adeptly control the agenda. Indeed, the entire system by which
medical care was organized and financed seemed designed to block racial
integration.
Most white hospital administrators and physicians, whatever their personal
feelings, acquiesced to the status quo. A few hospitals, particularly those
operated by religious orders and not tied as tightly to local medical
communities, such as Providence Hospital in Mobile, Alabama, attempted to
integrate their wards, but they were threatened by financial ruin from the white
flight of patients to neighboring segregated facilities. Many white health care
administrators and physicians in the urban North and border states tend to have
selective and generously rosy recollections of their racial integration initiatives
and the acceptance of the communities that they served when recalling the
integration efforts in the early Sixties. For example, the CEO of Methodist
Hospital in Gary, Indiana (Methodist Hospital), during the 1960s, stated
several years ago that the only thing that was not integrated by the beginning
of the 1960s at Methodist Hospital was room assignments and that all they
needed to do when remedying this was to instruct the registrars to stop
matching patients in rooms by race. He claimed that there existed a smooth
transition with only rare cases meeting objections, which merely required
relocating the objecting patient.32 Board meeting minutes of that time,
however, paint a picture of chaos and crisis. According to the Methodist
Hospital Board (the Board) meeting minutes, the CEO reported to the Board
that, while only two or three percent of the black patients objected to mixed
room assignments, approximately ninety percent of the white patients did.33
“[W]e have a condition of chaos and lowered level nursing care for the patients
in the hospital.”34
30. See, e.g., AUBRE DE L. MAYNARD, SURGEONS TO THE POOR: THE HARLEM HOSPITAL
STORY (1978).
31. Smith, The Racial Integration of Medical and Nursing Associations in the United States,
supra note 24, at 392.
32. Interview with Everett Johnson, Chief Executive Officer in the 1960s of Methodist
Hospital of Gary, Ind., in Atlanta, Ga. (June 10, 1996).
33. Minutes from the Special Meeting of the Board of Directors of Methodist Hospital of
Gary, Ind. 2 (Mar. 18, 1964) (on file with the NAACP in its Legal Defense Fund Files).
34. Id.
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For some leaders of the National Medical Association and the NAACP, the
hope had been that the Brown v. Board of Education35 decision would open the
courtroom door to Fourteenth Amendment equal protection challenges of racial
restrictions in access to staff privileges and hospital care. Nonetheless,
medical staff bylaws for both public and private hospitals usually stated that
the physician had to be a member in good standing in the local medical society
in order to be considered for membership in the medical staff. This stipulation
was one of the requirements for approval by the American College of
Surgeons’ hospital standardization program that was the main source for
accreditation of hospitals at the time. Ultimately, the College would be
relieved of this duty and the Joint Commission on Hospital Accreditation was
formed in 1951.36 Because most medical societies in the South specifically
excluded blacks from these private, partially social fraternities, black
physicians could never get past the first hurdle. In addition, it seemed dubious
that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment really applied
to the vast majority of hospitals in the United States, which were private,
voluntary, or for-profit institutions. While most voluntary hospitals received
some public subsidies and other dispensations from state and local
governments, it seemed a stretch, at the time, to argue that they were really
functioning as an “arm of the state” and were thus subject to the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The first case to decide the
issue of whether such institutions were subject to the Fourteenth Amendment
was brought by Dr. Hubert A. Eaton and two of his colleagues against The
James A. Walker Memorial Hospital in Wilmington, North Carolina.37 Walker
paid no city or county taxes, the hospital was built on land donated by the city,
and it had contracts with the county for the care of indigents. The District
Court, however, rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that these circumstances
constituted state action. The Supreme Court refused to review the case in
1959.38 This potential avenue for hospital integration appeared closed.
Indeed, only through an improbable sequence of events was this Gordian
knot at least partially cut. That sequence of events begins with the Hill–Burton
Act of 1946 (the Hill–Burton Act).39 Its author, Senator Lister Hill (D–Ala.),
who would later sign the pledge of massive resistance to the implementation of

35. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kan., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See
discussion infra text accompanying note 37.
36. See JOINT COMM’N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS, JCAHO
CORPORATE
OVERVIEW
BROCHURE
3
(2003),
http://www.jcaho.org/about+us/
corporate+brochure.htm.
37. Eaton v. Bd. of Managers of James Walker Mem’l Hosp., 261 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 984 (1959).
38. 359 U.S. 984 (1959).
39. Hospital Survey and Construction (Hill–Burton) Act, Pub. L. No. 79-725, 60 Stat. 1040
(1946) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 291–291o-1 (2000)).
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Brown, crafted the bill carefully. The Hill–Burton Act provided matching
funds to states for the construction of hospitals based on a plan developed by
the state that would assure adequate hospital facilities without discrimination
on account of race, creed, or color. Hill, however, made sure to insert in
section 622(f) of the original legislation the following provision:
[A]ssurance shall be received by the State from the applicant that (1) such
hospital or addition to a hospital will be made available to all persons residing
in the territorial area of the applicant, without discrimination on account of
race, creed, or color, but an exception shall be made in cases where separate
hospital facilities are provided for separate population groups, if the plan
makes equitable provision on the basis of need for facilities and services of
like quality for each such group.40

Most southern states proceeded with the construction of racially separate
facilities using federal Hill–Burton Act funds. They would have done so even
if the phrase “separate hospital facilities are provided for separate population
groups” had been excluded. The phrase inserted by Hill was the only one ever
inserted in federal legislation in the Twentieth Century that explicitly permitted
the use of federal funds for racially exclusionary services, but it was certainly
not the only federal funding program where racially discriminatory practices
took place. Unanticipated by its author, the Brown41 decision in 1954 would
bring that phrase unwanted attention.
The NAACP, with the endorsement of the National Medical Association
and National Dental Association, focused most of their efforts for health care
equality on this most transparently vulnerable link—the Hill–Burton Act,
which funded hospital construction on a “separate but equal” basis. Their
strategy was three pronged: (1) lobby for legislation that would explicitly
eliminate the separate but equal provision; (2) pressure the Executive Branch
to cease such practices on their own, and (3) bring court cases that would result
in a federal court ruling that this provision in the Hill–Burton Act was
unconstitutional. In 1961, they were able to interest Senator Jacob Javits (R–
N.Y.) in sponsoring a bill to eliminate the Hill–Burton Act’s “separate but
equal” provision, but it went nowhere. In that same year, they were hopeful
that newly-elected President Kennedy, who had promised in the campaign to
end racial discrimination by executive order “with the stroke of a pen,”42 could
help their cause, but no action was immediately forthcoming.

40. Hospital Survey and Reconstruction Act § 622(f), 60 Stat. at 1043 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 291e(f) (1946)). This section was omitted in the general revision of the Hill–
Burton Act by the Hospital and Medical Facilities Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-443, 78
Stat. 447.
41. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
42. See, e.g., TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS
1954–63, 587 (1988).
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Within the new Kennedy Administration, there was a flurry of activity to
find something the President could do without introducing his own civil rights
legislation and facing the embarrassment of certain defeat, which would have
been assured by the southern members of his own party. The General Counsel
for the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (DHEW), however,
concluded that without explicit authorization from Congress to withhold funds
or without explicit rejection by the federal courts of the constitutionality of
parts of legislation that permitted “separate but equal” use of federal funds, the
Executive Branch had no authority whatsoever to withhold funds on such a
basis.43 In terms of current federal activity, only the Hill–Burton Act made
clear the intention of Congress to allow money to be spent in ways that would
condone discrimination on the basis of race.
Meanwhile, George Simkins, a dentist in Greensboro, North Carolina, had
organized a suit against two of Greensboro’s hospitals.44 Greensboro had three
hospitals: Wesley Long Community Hospital (Wesley Long), an all-white
hospital; L. Richardson Hospital (L. Richardson), an all-black facility that
provided privileges to both black and white physicians and dentists; and Moses
H. Cone Memorial Hospital (Moses Cone), the largest and most well-endowed
facility that restricted privileges to white physicians but provided some limited
space for black patients transferred from L. Richardson by white physicians
who also had privileges at Moses Cone for specialized services that were not
available at L. Richardson.45 Moses Cone had received about $1.2 million in
Hill–Burton Act funds, and Wesley Long received about $1.9 million.46 A
patient had come to Dr. Simkins with an abscessed swollen jaw, but L.
Richardson had a two-week waiting list for a bed. The hospital had become so
overcrowded that they moved patients into beds in the hallways. Moses Cone
had empty beds but refused to take the patient. The suit, brought by Simkins,
claimed discrimination in access to hospital privileges for black physicians and
dentists in Greensboro and discrimination in access to treatment for black
patients. It also challenged the constitutionality of the “separate but equal”
provisions in the Hill–Burton Act.47
To the surprise of both the defendants and the plaintiffs, the Justice
Department intervened, seeking a determination of the constitutionality of the
controversial Hill–Burton Act. All parties acknowledged the fact of racial
43. See generally David Barton Smith, Addressing Racial Inequities in Health Care: Civil
Rights Monitoring and Report Cards, 23 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 75 (1998); Memorandum
from Parke M. Banta, General Counsel to the Sec’y of the Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare, to
the Secretary (Sept. 19, 1961) (on file with the author).
44. Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 938 (1964).
45. See id. at 965.
46. Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 211 F. Supp. 628, 638 (E.D. N.C. 1962).
47. Simkins, 323 F.2d at 961-62.
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discrimination in terms of the exclusion from the two hospitals. The Simkins
case hinged, as the earlier Eaton48 case had, on whether the hospitals could be
considered instruments of the state, and thus come under the constitutional
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Simkins, the District Court
ruled that the hospitals were not instruments of the state and dismissed the
case.49 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this ruling in a 3–2 split
decision, concluding that the hospitals, by virtue of their involvement in the
state Hill–Burton plan, were indeed instruments of the state. It also ruled that
the Hill–Burton Act’s “separate but equal” provision was unconstitutional.50
On March 2, 1964, the Supreme Court declined to review the decision, and the
Kennedy Administration got the clarification that it sought from the courts.51
The site of this major breakthrough embraces special ironies today. The
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals is located in a building that once housed the
Confederate Treasury and the offices of Jefferson Davis, President of the
Confederacy. It was the last federal court of appeals to be racially integrated
as the Senate confirmation of an African-American justice came only in 2001,
with Senator Trent Lott casting the lone dissenting vote.52 It is a court that has,
in more recent history and partly through judicial appointments supported by
Strom Thurmond, quietly moved the federal judicial system ever further
toward the right side of the political spectrum.53
The new court decision had not taken place in a vacuum, of course.
Protests that had been simmering in the 1950s exploded almost spontaneously
into a widespread grassroots movement in the early 1960s. Many of the
images of this period still regularly flash before us in the background of news
pieces and documentaries. The student lunch counter sit-in movement had
begun at a Woolworth’s in Greensboro in February 1960, and it spread quickly
to more than one hundred communities. In May 1963, Birmingham,
Alabama’s Bull Connor had turned high-pressure fire hoses and police dogs on
school children demonstrating against segregated accommodations in
downtown Birmingham. The children filled the jails and flooded the national
news with images that stunned the nation. In June, President Kennedy, after
much prodding, introduced his long-delayed civil rights bill to Congress.54

48. Eaton v. Bd. of Managers of James Walker Mem’l Hosp., 261 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 984 (1959).
49. See Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 211 F. Supp. 628, 634-35, 641 (E.D. N.C.
1962).
50. Simkins, 323 F.2d at 969.
51. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Simkins, 376 U.S. 938 (1964) (denying certiorari).
52. Deborah Sontag, The Power of the Fourth: How One Appellate Court Is Quietly Moving
America Ever Rightward, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2003, (Magazine) at 38, 45.
53. See id.
54. Special Message to the Congress on Civil Rights and Job Opportunities, in PUB. PAPERS
OF JOHN F. KENNEDY 483, 492 (June 19, 1963).
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Almost in direct response, Medgar Evers, the NAACP Field Director in
Mississippi, was shot to death in Jackson, Mississippi on June 12, 1963.55 In
August, Washington, D.C. played host to a demonstration in support of civil
rights legislation that included Martin Luther King’s “I Have A Dream”
speech.56 Several weeks later, a bomb at the 16th Street Baptist Church in
Birmingham, where many protest marches had been organized, killed four
young girls during Sunday school services. Trying to mend badly damaged
political fences in preparation for a difficult election, President Kennedy took
his fateful trip to Dallas that November.
President Lyndon B. Johnson turned the passage of Kennedy’s proposed
civil rights bill into the only appropriate way to honor the death of our nation’s
fallen leader.57 The bill worked its way through Congress shadowing the
Simkins case in the courts. The Supreme Court’s seeming affirmation of
Simkins by refusing to hear the case came just days before the debate regarding
the civil rights bill was to begin in the Senate. It transformed a vague and
controversial section of the bill into something that now seemed like almost a
redundant detail. Title VI of the bill simply made more explicit the unofficial
ruling of the Supreme Court. President Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act
into law on July 2, 1964, with Title VI essentially unaltered.58 In theory, not
only was the “separate but equal” provision struck from the Hill–Burton Act’s
hospital construction funding, but also now, federal funds could not be
allocated to agencies or organizations that discriminated on the basis of race.
The enforcement of Title VI in the Hill–Burton Act, of course, would have
not done much by itself to assure the integration of hospitals. It would have
been almost impossible for federal officials to force the integration of facilities
that had already received funds. Refusal to grant additional funds on a
separate-but-equal basis would have forced some facilities to choose not to
seek additional funds. Moses Cone, for example, briefly explored the
possibility of returning the Hill–Burton Act funds it had received to avoid any
potential challenge to their autonomy in such matters.59
These same turbulent events of the early Sixties also helped consolidate a
new consensus for health care reform. The prolonged social debate after
World War II resulted from a broad recognition that some kind of federal
action was needed to assure access to medical care. The resulting gridlock
reflected two seemingly unresolvable issues: (1) whether the program should
55. See, e.g., Branch, supra note 42, at 824-25.
56. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Address delivered at the March on Washington for Jobs and
Freedom (Aug. 28, 1963) (commonly referred to as the “I Have A Dream” speech).
57. HEALTH CARE DIVIDED, supra note 4, at 100.
58. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a–2000h-6 (2000)).
59. HEALTH CARE DIVIDED, supra note 4, at 94 n.71, 347 (citing Minutes of Executive
Committee, Moses Cone Memorial Hospital 1048 (Mar. 11, 1964)).
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be administered by the states or federal government, and (2) whether it should
be financed by social insurance as a “right” or supplied only to the indigent on
the basis of a means test.60 If only for a fleeting moment in the middle of the
1960s, the answer shifted to a federally funded and rights type of solution.
Few could advocate for state and local autonomy in the face of such vivid
images of defiance of the rights of African-Americans. There was also a
yearning for reconciliation and less of a willingness to revert to the almost
punitive means-tested formulas. It was a moment in many ways similar to the
convulsive experiences of the Great Depression that produced the passage of
the original Social Security legislation.61 The Medicare legislation62 was
passed as a result of this brief moment of convergence. It was, in a very real
sense, the major unacknowledged gift to the American people of the Civil
Rights Movement. The same coalition that had worked for passage of the
Civil Rights Act also worked for the passage of Medicare.63 The only
organized medical group to support the passage of Medicare was the National
Medical Association (NMA). The NAACP, at its annual convention in June
1964, supported the passage of the Medicare legislation. The President of the
NMA also testified in support of its passage at hearings before the Senate
Finance Committee in May of 1965.64 The language President Johnson used in
arguing for the passage of Medicare was even reminiscent of that used to
support the passage of the Civil Rights legislation. Johnson signed the
Medicare and Medicaid legislation into law on July 30, 1965, and only a week
later, he signed into law the Voting Rights Act.65

60. HERMAN MILES SOMERS & ANNE RAMSAY SOMERS, MEDICARE AND THE HOSPITALS:
ISSUES AND PROSPECTS 5 (1967).
61. See Social Security Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301–1397 (2000)).
62. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub L. No. 89-97, Title XVIII, § 102, 79 Stat. 291
(July 30, 1965) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. 1395-1395gggg).
63. See generally DONA COOPER HAMILTON & CHARLES V. HAMILTON, THE DUAL
AGENDA: RACE AND SOCIAL WELFARE POLICIES OF CIVIL RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS (Robert Y.
Shapiro ed., 1997).
64. NMA President’s Testimony in Support of H.R. 6675: “An Act to Provide Hospital
Insurance Program for the Aged Under the Social Security Act”, 57 J. NAT’L MED. ASS’N 335
(1965).
65. See HEALTH CARE DIVIDED, supra note 4, at 120-121. President Johnson signed the
Medicare legislation on July 30, 1965 at the Truman Library in Independence, Missouri. Id. at
120. Johnson signed the 1965 Voters’ Rights Act on August 6, 1965. See Social Security
Amendments of 1965, Pub L. No. 89-97, Title XVIII, § 102, 79 Stat. 291 (July 30, 1965)
(codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. 1395-1395gggg) (Medicare); Social Security Amendments of
1965, Pub L. No. 89-97, Title XIX, § 121, 79 Stat. 343 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 1396–
1396v (2000) (Medicaid); Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, Title I, § 2, 79 Stat.
437 (Aug. 6, 1965).
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V. ENFORCING TITLE VI IN THE MEDICARE PROGRAM
Unlike the Hill–Burton Act, which offered time-limited matching funds for
approved hospital construction projects, Medicare represented a profound shift
in the financing of medical care in the United States. Combined with
Medicaid, it meant that the bulk of the income received by most hospitals and
physicians would flow from public sources. At least in theory, hospitals and
physicians would now have to choose between complying with the
requirements imposed by Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and thereby assuring
their financial health, or not complying, and almost certainly assuring their
financial ruin. Medicare was scheduled to go into effect on July 1, 1966.66
Implementing a program of such size and complexity in less than a year
represented a major challenge. The cooperation of hospitals and physicians
was essential to assure an orderly transition. The American Medical
Association had opposed the passage of Medicare, and some local medical
societies were threatening to boycott participation in the program. If
Medicare’s supporters had envisioned it as strictly a health insurance program,
there is no question that it would have delayed enforcement of Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act because its detractors would have found a way to circumvent
the requirements of the Civil Rights Act altogether.
The Johnson
Administration, in spite of the warnings of many experts, however, chose to
use the Medicare program as a way to end the racial segregation in hospitals
once and for all.
What followed, according to many observers, was as close to a miracle as
anything ever accomplished by the federal bureaucracy. The Office of Equal
Health Opportunity had been set up in the Surgeon General’s Office of the
Public Health Service at the end of 1965 with only six months to go before the
implementation of Medicare.67 It consisted of only one professional staff
person, and the procedures for assuring Title VI compliance with Medicare
providers had yet to be worked out. Secretary John Gardner, the only
Republican in President Johnson’s cabinet, announced that the DHEW was
now a civil rights organization. This was not just public relations rhetoric. It
was a maneuver to, at least in the short run, circumvent congressional
oversight and control to ensure that the initiative never had the resources to
make the Medicare–Title VI compliance initiative anything more than a
symbolic paper-pushing process.
Secretary Gardner directed the temporary reassignment of 750 DHEW
employees to the Office of Equal Health Opportunity. Each division chief was
responsible for recruiting a quota of volunteers from their staff and for
assuming responsibility for their salaries and travel expenses. If the quota was
66. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub L. No. 89-97, Title XVIII, § 102, 79 Stat.
291 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. 1395-1395gggg).
67. HEALTH CARE DIVIDED, supra note 4, at 128-129.
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not met, they were to draft people. In reality, enough people within the DHEW
had become so involved in local civil rights demonstrations and activities that,
not only was it never necessary to draft anyone, but most of the volunteers they
did recruit were also passionately committed to the success of the effort. Civil
rights groups such as the NMA, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, and the
Medical Committee for Human Rights played the role of its staunchest allies
and severest critics. Local community civil rights groups included black
employees at the local hospitals, so that when surveys and inspections for Title
VI compliance were undertaken, the prior intelligence gathering was precise
and concealment almost impossible. Many hospital officials used it as an
opportunity to integrate hospital services that they had come to believe was the
right thing to do, but had hesitated in the face of what they assumed to be
overwhelming community hostility. Now, all hospitals would have to comply,
and even hospital officials hostile to integration recognized that it would be
essential for the financial survival of their institution. As the July 1, 1966,
deadline approached, more than 1,000 hospitals had quietly and uneventfully
integrated their medical staffs, waiting rooms and hospital floors.68
It should be noted that Virginia, Mississippi, Alabama, and some other
southern states resisted these efforts at first by arguing instead for a “freedom
of choice” plan for achieving compliance with Title VI.69 That is, a black
patient should have the right to “choose” whether they wanted to be admitted
to an all-black facility or one that had previously been all white. They argued
that patients should be free to “choose” whether they wanted to be placed in a
white wing or in a semi-private room with a white patient. As one black
witness testified in one of the early hearings on this issue, he did not “choose”
to have his daughter placed in a white wing because “‘[w]ho knows what
would be done to her in the hospital after making such a choice.’”70 The only
way to assure integration was to take the choice away from the individual and
insist that everyone, regardless of race or income, be treated equally in the
Medicare program. It is chilling for anyone familiar with this history and the
purpose of the Medicare program to hear our current President arguing for
“freedom of choice” in “reforming” the Medicare program. That proposal, if
implemented, would force the “choice” of Medicare beneficiaries with low or
moderate incomes towards more restrictive plans separate from those plans
“chosen” by the more affluent who can afford the additional out-of-pocket
costs.

68. See id. at 134-42.
69. Id. at 148.
70. Id. at 148, 351 (citing Memorandum from Marilyn Rose, former legal counsel to the
Office of Equal Health Opportunity, to author (Nov. 20, 1997)).
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Yet, instead of lagging behind other sectors of American life, hospitals
were leading integration efforts. Those involved shook their heads in disbelief.
They perhaps had a right to be skeptical.
VI. THE END OF AN ERA
The Office of Equal Health Opportunity had walked a political tight rope
between enforcing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act in the new Medicare
program and not interfering with the practice of medicine. Soon after the
implementation of Medicare, the Office of Equal Health Opportunity lost its
balance. DHEW’s General Counsel had chosen to exempt physicians from
compliance with Title VI. The General Counsel argued that Part B of
Medicare,71 the part that paid for physician services through a voluntary,
federally-subsidized plan, was a “contract of insurance” with its subscribers
and not a direct grant of public funds.72 This logic seemed convoluted to many
at the time, and it is certainly even more so now with the growth of integrated
delivery systems and managed care. However, the reality was that it would
have been almost impossible to define what Title VI compliance meant for
physician practices, and it would have been impossible to enforce.
Nevertheless, Title VI compliance for hospitals would be meaningless without
the ability to exert some control over the referral patterns of physicians.
Physicians could, as they had done in Chicago, simply selectively refer their
white and black patients to different hospitals maintaining de facto segregation.
The Mobile Infirmary Medical Center in Alabama (the Infirmary) became
a key test case for addressing medical staff organized de facto segregation.73

71. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395–1395w-4 (2000).
72. HEALTH CARE DIVIDED, supra note 4, at 162-163. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act had
included a compromise amendment offered by Senator Long (La.) that stated: “Nothing in this
title shall add to or detract from any exiting authority with respect to any program or activity
under which Federal financial assistance is extended by way of a contract of insurance or
guaranty.” Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VI, § 605, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
2004-d (2000)). The interpretation by the DHEW that this exempted Part B of Medicare from
Title VI enforcement was vigorously challenged by Civil Rights Commission Reports in 1975
and 1980. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 6 FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT
EFFORT—1974: TO EXTEND FEDERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 118-19 (1975); Letter from
Eileen M. Stein, General Counsel, to Louis Nunez, Staff Director (Oct. 7, 1980) (“Applicability
of Title VI to Medicare Part B”), reprinted in U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS
ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE DELIVERY: A CONSULTATION SPONSORED BY THE UNITED STATES
COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS APRIL 15–16, 1980, 851-64. The opposition to the 1964 civil rights
bill, fearing that Title VI might be used to break down discrimination in housing through federal
insurance programs for home mortgages and bank deposits, had been able to amend Title VI of
the bill to exempt such guaranty and contracts of insurance.
73. Audio tape: Interview with Marilyn Rose, Attorney for the Office of Equal Health
Opportunity, Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare during 1966–67, in Washington D.C. (Oct. 3,
1997) (on file with the author).
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The Infirmary had signed the Title VI assurances, but by its patient admissions,
it had remained almost exclusively white. The Infirmary never turned away a
patient, but many of its medical staff chose to admit only their white patients to
the Infirmary. A member of the Infirmary medical staff served as a secret
informant to the Office of Equal Health Opportunity so that its officials had a
clear understanding of the intention of many of the physicians on the hospital’s
staff to block the integration of the Infirmary through selective referrals.74
Faced with this situation, the Office of Equal Health Opportunity argued that
the hospital, by virtue of its board’s authority to approve the members and
privileges of its medical staff, had the authority to control their referral
practices and refused to grant it Title VI certification to allow it to receive
Medicare funds in July 1966. A bitter, protracted seven-month battle ensued
that culminated in the suspicious death of the key medical staff informant and
the cave-in of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, which
removed the Office of Equal Health Opportunity from the decision-making
process and certified the Infirmary for Medicare funds. Shortly afterwards, the
Office of Equal Health Opportunity was eliminated, and its functions were
absorbed into the Office for Civil Rights, a single central office responsible for
all civil rights enforcement, not just for Medicare enforcement. Many of the
key staff either resigned or refused reassignment to the central office. The
brief, turbulent life of one of the most productive agents of organizational
change in the history of the federal bureaucracy had ended.
The year 1966 was the high-water mark of the Civil Rights era, and by
1968 the federal civil rights offensive was in retreat. Urban riots, rather than
nonviolent protests, now began to capture media attention. The war in
Vietnam shifted attention and drained resources. In the early, heady
atmosphere, civil rights activities focused on the low-hanging fruit and the
easy, visible symbols of inequality. As the targets shifted towards more
difficult, structural changes that threatened the vested interests of the
establishment, the backlash gained momentum. Subsequent civil rights
initiatives in health care were caught in this conflicting current, as were every
other aspect of national life.
VII. WHAT HAD HAPPENED AND WHAT HAD NOT
Of course, as with the issue of race in other facets of American life, there
are two conflicting interpretations of what happened during the Civil Rights
era and what did not. The skeptical version concludes that the influence of
race on opportunities for health care treatment remained largely unchanged,
and the only real change was that such influences became more subtle and
hidden. The optimistic version of the situation concludes that, minor

74. Id.
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annoyances and statistical aberrations aside, the problem of race has been fixed
and health care is now race blind. The reality is a complex mixture of both
views. The gross disparities in access to care by race had indeed been
eliminated. At the same time, however, the adaptation of the health care
system to the contradictions of race shaped a peculiar accommodation that
continues to contribute to the distinctive problems faced by both providers and
consumers of health care and to the persistence of disparities in outcomes and
treatment in the United States.
Before Medicare and its companion program for the poor, Medicaid, the
common complaint was that the poorer you were, the more health care you
needed and the richer you were, the more health care you got. The gift of the
Civil Rights Movement through the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid was
to eliminate, at least in gross terms, the second part of this complaint. In 1964,
low-income persons received twenty-five percent fewer age-adjusted visits to
doctors as compared to high-income persons and seven percent fewer hospital
admissions.75 By 1975, the relationship between income and use of care had
been reversed, with low-income persons receiving eighteen percent more ageadjusted visits to doctors and fifty-one percent more hospital admissions.76
Racial differences in the use of care mirrored, in a less dramatic way, the
changes in use by income. In 1964, blacks received twenty-three percent
fewer visits to doctors as compared to whites and twenty-five percent fewer
hospital admissions.77 By 1975, blacks were making four percent fewer visits
to doctors and had four percent more hospital admissions.78 Within the
Medicare program itself, there has been a progressive narrowing of differences
in expenditures for white and non-white beneficiaries. In 1967, the first full
year of the program, hospital expenditures for non-whites were twenty-six
percent lower than for whites, physician expenditures forty percent lower, and
skilled nursing home expenditures sixty-six percent lower.79 These differences
in expenditures per beneficiary have progressively shifted. In 1995, for
example, the Medicare program was spending twenty-one percent more for
hospital care, thirteen percent more for medical services, and two percent less
for nursing care per non-white beneficiary than per white beneficiary.80
Except for physician visits, black use of health care relative to white use of
health care has progressively increased. The largest racial disparity in use was
for nursing home care. In 1964, blacks sixty-five and older were sixty-two
percent less likely to be residents in nursing homes than whites. In 1999,

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

HEALTH CARE DIVIDED, supra note 4, at 202-03.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 206.
HEALTH CARE DIVIDED, supra note 4, at 206.
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however, they were nine percent more likely to be residents in nursing
homes.81 However, because black/white disparities in health quality persist, it
is unclear how close these shifts in health care use reflect the actual need.
The institutions that cared for blacks and the poor before Medicare was
enacted were the major casualties of this transformation. Seventy black
hospitals closed or merged with historically white ones between 1961 and
1988.82 Only a handful of the more than 100 historically black hospitals that
existed at the beginning of this period continue to exist. These include the
teaching hospitals of Meharry and Howard University, a few small, struggling
community hospitals, and a small contingent of municipal hospitals that have
historically served black communities (such as Harlem Hospital Center and
Kings County Hospital Center in New York, Cook County Hospital in
Chicago, DC General Hospital in Washington, Grady Memorial Hospital in
Atlanta, etc.). Some hospitals that were the only places black physicians could
receive post-graduate training have been converted into nursing homes or
supportive residences for the elderly, such as Mercy–Douglas in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, and Homer G. Phillips Hospital in St. Louis, Missouri. Others,
such as Lincoln Hospital in Durham, North Carolina, were razed to make way
for a public clinic. Good Samaritan Hospital of Charlotte, North Carolina, the
oldest privately funded hospital in the state providing care exclusively for
blacks, was razed just before its 100th anniversary in 1991 to make room for
the new football stadium for the National Football League’s Carolina Panthers.
The hospital had been the center of the once thriving black community.83 A
plaque on the stadium wall, erected only after an organized protest, is the only
evidence left of this once vibrant training center for nurses and other allied
health professionals.84
The victors in the Civil Rights struggle were those communities that
worked with black physicians and their hospitals, but they were treated as if
they were conquered by an invading army and their resources cannibalized for
other purposes. It was not supposed to work that way, but indeed that is what
happened. Many black professionals and patients felt violated by what
happened and were less trustful of the new white-dominated institutions. Yet
acknowledging the personal advantages that these better-endowed institutions
offered, many had, however reluctantly, voted with their feet.

81. NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
CHARTBOOK ON TRENDS IN THE HEALTH OF AMERICANS 266 (2002), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/hus/htm.
82. See Wesley, supra note 23, at 28.
83. Valca Valentine, Historic Black Hospital Now Just History, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER,
Sept. 16, 1990, at 1B.
84. Audio tape: Interview with Reginald Hawkins, retired dentist and Presbyterian minister,
in Charlotte, N.C. (Feb. 2, 2000) (on file with author).
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The most profound legacy of the Civil Rights era for health care, however,
was how the selective enforcement of Title VI distorted the manner in which
services were organized. Title VI was rigorously enforced in hospitals. This
meant no separate waiting rooms or wards and no racial room-matching of
patients. If necessary, this would be enforced with on-site inspections. For
nursing homes, these requirements were essentially ignored. There were no
on-site inspections, and all nursing homes were required to do was sign a form
indicating that they did not discriminate and include similar notifications in
their advertising.85 Physician services in the Medicare program were
specifically exempted from Title VI compliance. Much of what is distinctive
about the way health care became organized in the United States was
influenced by this selective enforcement of Title VI.
Hospitals could minimize the effects of racial integration by expanding
private accommodations and minimizing inpatient use. One of the most
troubling ironies is that Medicare, which forced hospital integration, also
financed the growing separation through the financing of private
accommodations. Most of the hospitals in tense, racially mixed communities
converted to private accommodations. The Mobile metropolitan area now
provides almost all private accommodations as does Charlotte, North Carolina.
Hospitals in racially tense neighborhoods in Philadelphia, such as St Mary’s
Medical Center, were constructed in the 1970s with all private
accommodations explicitly for this purpose. In Durham, North Carolina, a
participant in the construction of Durham Regional Hospital, which would
combine the services provided by a historically-black and a historically-white
hospital, said, “‘[w]e argued in the planning for weeks about whether it should
have any semiprivate rooms because of the race problem. It took care of
itself.’”86 The unique emphasis in the United States has been on reducing
acute bed capacity and length of stay. The United States has one of the lowest
average length of stays and the lowest acute bed-to-population ratio of any
developed nation in the world.87 Yet, the cost of hospital care in the United
States per capita is about twice that of any other country88 and the “drive
through” deliveries and one-day mastectomies have sparked a consumer
rebellion.
The general consensus among health care policy makers and managers in
the 1950s was that long-term care should be organizationally integrated into a
85. HEALTH CARE DIVIDED, supra note 4, at 160-61.
86. Id. at 233, 363 (citing an interview with a physician at Watts Hospital, Durham, N.C.
(August 28, 1996)).
87. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, HEALTH AT A
GLANCE 27, 37 (2001).
88. GERARD F. ANDERSON ET AL., MULTINATIONAL COMPARISONS OF HEALTH SYSTEMS
DATA, 2002, at 9 (2002), available at http://www.cmwf.org (comparing the performance of
health care systems in eight industrialized countries).
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hospital complex or health care campus. If development had continued in this
direction, Title VI would have been enforced for nursing homes because the
non-discrimination provisions would have been imposed for all services
provided by the entity. What happened, of course, was quite different. A
completely independent, for-profit, chain-operated, long-term sector emerged;
and in the decade after the passage of Medicare and Medicaid, nursing home
beds in the United States more than doubled, expanding to more than one
million beds and exceeding the hospital sector in total beds. Not surprisingly,
the long-term care sector is far more racially segregated, still engages in overt
room matching, and continues to provide access in such a way that blacks are
more likely to be admitted to the more substandard homes.89
Exempt from Title VI oversight, physician practice patterns contribute to
many of the persistent disparities in treatment, yet the only major efforts to
attempt to hold the health care system accountable to Title VI since 1968 have
involved class action suits focused on the closing and relocation of hospitals
that have adversely affected black communities. These attempts have largely
been ineffective.90 The relocation of hospitals are events that cannot be easily
concealed from the communities the hospitals serve, and the focus on such
challenges underscores the almost complete failure to routinely collect
information to provide at least some minimal assurances that the patients are
being treated fairly. In introducing his civil rights bill more than forty years
ago, President Kennedy said, “[s]imple justice requires that public funds, to
which all taxpayers of all races contribute, not be spent in any fashion which
encourages, entrenches, subsidizes or results in racial discrimination.”91 At
least in health care, assurance of such simple justice still eludes us. More than
one-half trillion public taxpayer dollars (more than $500,000,000,000) now
flow into our health care system annually without holding health care providers
accountable.92
VIII. WHAT HAPPENS NOW?
In the last two years, there has been much activity focused on reducing
racial disparities in health care treatment. The Institute of Medicine has
recently produced a report on racial disparities in treatment and strategies for
89. See generally David Barton Smith, Population Ecology and the Racial Integration of
Hospitals and Nursing Homes in the United States, 68 MILBANK Q. 561 (1990); David Barton
Smith, The Racial Integration of Heath Facilities, 18 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 851, 855-57
(1993).
90. See, e.g., HEALTH CARE DIVIDED, supra note 4, at 173-83.
91. Special Message to the Congress on Civil Rights and Job Opportunities, supra note 54.
92. See National Health Care Source of Funds: Selected Calendar Years, in Ctr. for
Medicare and Medicaid Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 2002 Data Compendium,
available at http://cms.hhs.gov/researchers/pubs/datacompendium/ (last modified on Sept. 24,
2003).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2003]

HEALTHCARE’S HIDDEN CIVIL RIGHTS LEGACY

59

eliminating them called Unequal Treatment: Confronting Racial and Ethnic
Disparities in Health Care.93 The Institute of Medicine also released a widely
praised final report—Crossing the Quality Chasm— that identifies equity as
one of the key goals for improving the quality of care in the nation’s
hospitals.94 Additionally, we are three years into the broadly supported
national initiative, Healthy People 2010, which has as one of its major goals
the elimination of racial and income disparities in outcomes.95 A national
report measuring progress in reducing disparities in health is about to be
released by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.96 Yet during
these same two years, there has been a massive disengagement in employersponsored health insurance and growing payment restrictions in Medicare and
Medicaid that seem to guarantee increasingly separate and unequal care.
These modern contradictions seem so perfectly embodied in the new
Senate majority leader, Senator William Frist (R–Tenn.), that it would make
for implausible fiction. In 1968, the Hospital Corporation of America, which
Frist’s father helped found, became the first of a new breed of companies to
take advantage of the new Medicare and Medicaid programs in creating a forprofit hospital chain. Some of those resulting profits now make him one of the
Senate’s wealthiest legislators. As a cardiovascular surgeon, Senator Frist has
been presented as a healer of the racial divisions made more visible by Senator
Lott’s comments. Ironically, the strongest and most consistent evidence of
racial disparities in treatment, according to the Institute of Medicine’s recent
review of the research, are in cardiovascular care!97 These large racial
disparities in treatment for cardiovascular care that cannot be explained by
insurance alone and seem to be at the center of all of the unfinished business of
the Civil Rights era in terms of Title VI compliance in health care quality.
Why should such contradictions be viewed any differently than the one
observed by President Abraham Lincoln at the time of the Civil War about a
government and a Union that “cannot endure, permanently half slave and half

93. UNEQUAL TREATMENT, supra note 4.
94. COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE,
CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 5-6 (2001).
95. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF DISEASE PREVENTION AND
HEALTH PROMOTION, HEALTHY PEOPLE 2010, http://www.healthypeople.gov.
96. AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTHCARE DISPARITIES REPORT: COMMENT ON DISPARITY MEASURES.
A preliminary background report is available at http://www.ahcpr.gov/qual/nhdr02/
nhdrprelim.htm. Congress mandated that the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
produce an annual report on health care disparities in the United States. See Healthcare Research
and Quality Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-129, 113 Stat. 1653 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 299–299c-7 (2000)).
97. UNEQUAL TREATMENT, supra note 4, at 5.
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free,”98 or any differently than what Gunnar Myrdal observed in An American
Dilemma during World War II about the values of equality and disparities in
opportunities?99 Perhaps it is time to take a fresh look at that past and design a
more promising future. The true legacy of the Civil Rights era for health care
must be the lesson that grassroots social movements and real accountability in
the use of public funds can and should make a difference.

98. Abraham Lincoln, A House Divided: Speech Delivered at Springfield, Illinois at the
Close of the Republican State Convention (June 16, 1858), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: HIS
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 372-81 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1981) (1946).
99. See GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN
DEMOCRACY (1944).

